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Another challenge is to explain away a tension between extended blame and
Mason’s detached/ordinary contrast. The tension emerges as follows: if the blame-
less can aptly take responsibility by engaging in conversation, then so, presumably,
can the culpable. After all, intimate relationships are not the only valuable relation-
ships that demand responses to our mistakes, and the relational stakes of culpably
wronging others seem at least as high as the relational stakes of, for example, for-
getting the milk.
This supports the view that it is apt for those who Mason thinks warrant de-
tached blame—deeply ignorant wrongdoers—to take responsibility, that is, to enable
blaming conversations where the normal grounds for communicative blame are ab-
sent. Mason seems open to that conclusion (144). However, here is the problem in
accepting it: if it is apt for the deeply ignorant to take responsibility and enable con-
versation, it also seems apt for others to encourage them to do so through conver-
sation. At first glance at least, compared to shunning the deeply ignorant, it seems
no less apt to encourage them to do something that is apt for them to do, through
the very process that it is apt for them to engage in. This gives another reason to
questionMason’s idea that communicating blame to the deeply ignorant is pointless.
As we have seen, that idea elegantly ties together the main theses in the book.
To further develop the overall vision of our blaming practices that it underpins, we
might compare the costs of taking a slightly more inclusive approach. On this ap-
proach, shunning the deeply ignorant from our moral community might some-
times be apt, but communicating with them is never wholly inapt. Communication
recognizes our shared agency and encourages reflection in those agents who most
urgently need to take responsibility: to respond to having flouted values they should
grasp but cannot yet grasp. There remain plenty of avenues to explore on this issue,
however, and for that, normative and responsibility theorists alike have Mason’s
arguments loudly to thank.
Kartik Upadhyaya
University of Warwick
Moran, Richard. The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 254. $105.00 (cloth).
Many of us can recall amoment whenwe realized—perhaps with some level of per-
plexity, or even disturbance—that the vast majority of our knowledge of the world
has its foundations in the testimony of other people, rather than in our own per-
sonal experiences. The fact that testimony plays such a privileged role in knowl-
edge formation places it at the center of epistemological inquiry, along with, for
example, perception. In order to feel secure about the status of beliefs formed
on the basis of testimony, we must understand how this speech act can provide le-
gitimate reasons for belief, thus paving the way to knowledge. Testimony also has a
range of other philosophically perplexing features. Unlike perception, for in-
stance, testimony is a distinctively social and relational affair; it not only provides
reasons for belief but also changes normative relationships between agents. In re-
lying on the testimony of others, we count on speakers themselves—not just their
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words—in forging our own epistemological commitments, and we are justified in
holding them accountable for leading us astray. The testifier, in turn, counts on
her audience in myriad ways; she cannot succeed in passing on her knowledge
of the world via testimonial exchange unless she obtains a certain level of cooper-
ation from her audience and their recognition of what she is trying to do. In The
Exchange of Words, Richard Moran explores the link between this social/relational
aspect of testimony and its peculiar and distinctive power to provide reasons for
belief. The very fact that testimony involves such dependence on others might
cause us to question its strength and legitimacy as a source of such reasons; how-
ever, Moran argues that it is this very feature which endows testimony with its
epistemic significance.
The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 delineate the topic
and focus of the book, as an exploration of the social/relational nature of testi-
mony, with an eye to its distinctive epistemic significance. Though the details
of the positive proposal are not introduced until later chapters, here Moran pro-
vides an initial sketch of his assurance account by tracing its philosophical ancestry
and introducing its core commitments. In particular, this account can be seen as a
development of Thomas Reid’s picture of testimony as an act of mind which is
essentially social in that it must necessarily be expressed and that this expression
is directed to another intelligent being who plays a role in its completion. The ac-
count also follows a broader tradition (associated with Aristotle and Hobbes) of
identifying the capacity for speech as a precondition for political life; testimony is
understood as a manifestation of the authority of the speaker made possible by
her participation in a broader institution and dependent on the recognition
and cooperation of others. The rest of the book is an elaboration on this picture
of testimony as an essentially social/relational phenomenon.
Moran thinks that the social/relational aspect of testimony provides the key
to understanding its distinctive epistemic significance. His explication of testimo-
ny’s power to provide epistemic reasons relies heavily on setting up a foil which
fails to account for it: a picture which he calls the “evidential” view, according
to which a speaker’s testimony functions as evidence for the truth of the content
of this speech act, thus providing the audience a reason to believe it. An evidential
view can take many forms, but since Moran’s discussion focuses largely on the in-
fluential Gricean account, it is worth briefly outlining that view here. Grice’s ac-
count has undergonemany iterations and developments, but here is a rough syn-
opsis of one version Moran considers:
In uttering u, S testifies to A that p just in case S intends
1. A to believe that S believes p;
2. A to recognize her intention that (1); and
3. that (2) provide A with a reason for (1).
On this picture, the immediate goal of the utterance is to provide evidence of the
speaker’s mental states, which in turn will provide evidence for the truth of the
asserted proposition (given additional assumptions about the reliability and trust-
worthiness of the speaker). So, the speaker’s testimony provides a reason for the
audience to believe the content of her utterance by providing (indirect) evidence
of its truth.
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Moran claims that, by treating the speaker as a mere source of evidence, the
Gricean picture obscures the social relationship that is so fundamental to testimo-
nial exchange and the distinctive kinds of epistemic reasons it provides. In relying
on another’s testimony, we are not merely relying on a piece of evidence that as-
sumes an objective epistemic status upon completion of the speaker’s utterance;
rather, we are relying on the speaker herself, and she is accountable to us if her
assertion turns out to be false.Moreover, Moran claims that this picture cannot ex-
plain why it is the case that in order for testimony to serve its epistemic function,
the speaker must understand what she is doing and do it intentionally. Not only
would this condition be irrelevant if her testimony were merely serving as evi-
dence—as any reliable connection between her assertion and the truth of its con-
tent would do, regardless of its relation to the speaker’s mental states—but it
would also seem to downgrade the status of testimony as a reason for belief. Any
evidence which is produced intentionally carries the risk of being doctored, in-
creasing its likelihood of inaccuracy. Not only does the Gricean view fail to explain
the privileged status of the speaker’s intentions in providing a reason for belief,
but it also fails to explain why recognition of these intentions should provide a rea-
son for belief at all, according toMoran, who asks, “Why cooperate with [the speak-
er’s] designs on me, however benign?” (57).
Identifying the weakness of the evidential approach allows Moran to start to
sketch out a picture of what a successful account of testimony should look like—
a picture whose details are filled in throughout the remainder of the book, with
continuous use of the evidential approach (for which the Gricean account serves
as a paradigm) as a contrastive foil. In order to account for the way in which the
speaker’s intentions and understanding of her actions can serve to provide the au-
dience with a reason for belief, we need a theory which brings out the social/rela-
tional aspect of testimony.Moranclaims thathis assurance account cando just that:
the audience’s reason for belief comes from the speaker’s assurance—that is, her
public assumption of responsibility for the truth of her statement. Assurance is by
nature an intentional act; this very feature provides the audience with a reason to
believe the testified content, because she knows that the speaker has intentionally
taken on responsibility for its truth and is willing to be held accountable for it.
Chapters 3 and 4 argue against an old picture of the value and significance of
sincerity in testimony—associated with the evidential view—and demonstrate
how a more explanatory picture follows from the assurance account. The fact
to be explained is what Moran calls testimony’s Sincerity condition: “The Sincerity
condition tells us that the speaker’s utterance must be presumed to be sincere, as
reflecting her actual beliefs (or intentions, etc.), if it is to fulfill the function of an
act of telling, which is to provide a reason to believe what is said” (113). According
to the evidential view, sincerity is epistemically valuable because it provides other-
wise inaccessible access to speaker’s beliefs/mental states, which in turn provide
evidence about the world. But Moran complains that if testimony were merely a
matter of a speaker’s presenting evidence and leaving others to draw their own
conclusions, this would leave out the responsibility that she assumes in testifying;
it would not be her concern if the audience assigned the wrong evidential value to
her words and formed false beliefs as a consequence. The evidential picture ob-
scures the fact that in taking testimony as a reason for belief, the audience relies
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on the speaker herself—rather than relying merely on the assumption that the
speaker’s beliefs correspond to her words. In contrast, the assurance picture takes
a more relational approach to explaining the epistemic significance of sincerity.
If the speaker is sincere, then her belief in what she says has survived her reflec-
tion, and she has taken up responsibility for its truth by presenting it as belief-
worthy—not only for herself but also for others. Moreover, the assurance view
provides an explanation of why testimony is successful only if the speaker under-
stands what she is doing. A lack of understanding of the significance of her action
undermines the key components of reflection and responsibility which provide
the audience with a reason for belief in the testified content.
Chapters 5–7 elaborate on the distinctively interpersonal nature of testimony
with a discussion of the nature of second-personal reasons. Second-personal rea-
sons are those whose status as reasons essentially relates two people to each other
as complainant and complainee; they can be contrasted with monadic reasons,
which lack this feature. Moran claims that testimonial exchange provides distinc-
tively second-personal reasons for belief. When a speaker gives her testimony, she
transforms the relationship between herself and her audience into that of poten-
tial complainant and complainee, respectively. Should the speaker’s testimony
turn out to be false, the audience has a right to hold her accountable. The eviden-
tial view cannot account for this feature of testimony, because evidence—accord-
ing to Moran—can only give monadic reasons; while one agent might be respon-
sible for the act of producing evidence, once she has done so, this evidence
becomes an impersonal feature of the world. Another agent’s decision to assign
it evidential weight is something which that agent herself ultimately bears respon-
sibility for, and she alone is to blame if she gets it wrong.
The assurance view, in contrast, reveals the second-personal nature of testimony
by treating it as a power todelimit one’s claims and responsibilities—a power which
lies at the heart of second-personal reasons. By taking on such responsibilities,
the speaker forges a relationship between herself and her audience as potential
complainant and complainee. Moreover, this picture of testimony brings out an-
other relational feature which bears on its epistemic significance: the importance
of reciprocity in establishing a distinctively testimonial reason for belief. While it is
up to the speaker to determine the illocutionary force of her utterance (i.e., as an
assertion rather than a question), the success of her speech act relies on the recog-
nition of the audience. The speaker’s testimony does not count as a reason for be-
lief unless the audience recognizes the speaker to have presented it as such. In con-
trast to the evidential view, which treats the speaker as source and the audience as
object, the assurance view shows how testimonial exchange involves two parties in a
relation as interlocutors.
The Exchange of Words successfully highlights both the need to account for
the social/relational aspect of testimony and the failure of much of the literature
to give it due attention. Moran convincingly argues that approaching the topic of
testimony from a purely epistemological standpoint invites a methodology which
masks its essentially social and communicative character—treating speaker as a
source and audience as a consumer, rather than as interlocutors with shared de-
pendencies and responsibilities. However, while certain approaches—in particular,
the evidential approach which Moran uses as a foil throughout the book—may
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underplay certain social/relational aspects of testimony, it is far less clear that
they ultimately lack the tools to account for them. In particular, his discussion of
the Gricean approach glosses over a tool that is not only available to but also es-
sential to that project—namely, an appeal to general norms of social behavior.
For instance, while it is true that second-personal normativity is not constitu-
tive of the speech act of testifying on standard Gricean accounts, we can expect it
to be derived from these accounts taken together with general norms of social
behavior. The Gricean account defines the speech act of testimony in terms of
speakers’ intentional actions, which are plausibly subject to various kinds of
norms—some of them interpersonal in nature. For instance, we might expect a
second-personal norm prohibiting a speaker’s intentional presentation of mis-
leading evidence; if her audience is rational, such evidence will alter their cre-
dences in decreased alignment with the truth. Such an epistemic alteration will
be disadvantageous in its own right on the assumption that there is intrinsic value
in representing the world accurately, and it will carry risk of being instrumentally
disadvantageous given that they may act on those credences to their detriment.
An audiencemember would certainly have grounds for complaint if a speaker in-
tentionally placed her in such a position; thus, appealing to general social norms
provides the Gricean account with an explanation for speakers’ responsibility to
their audiences to testify sincerely. Detractors, of course, have room to push back
against this explanation, and Moran touches on interesting potential weak spots
in the Gricean approach. However, by glossing over a range of tools that are fun-
damental to the broader Gricean picture of communication, he fails to convinc-
ingly establish that it is unable to account for the second-personal normativity of
testimony.
Moran’s focused critique of his evidentialist foil also seemed to come at the
cost of addressing someof the deeper explanatory questions invited by thepositive
proposal. In particular, why should one’s assurance provide another with a reason
to believe? This is an interesting question, and providing a satisfactory answer to it
is crucial to Moran’s project—yet he seems to take it for granted that assurance
serves this function, without spelling out the details. For something to be a purely
epistemic reason for belief, itmust serve thegoal of that action (perhaps knowledge,
understanding, ormaximizing true and significant beliefs whileminimizingothers).
It is not clear how assurance—and its accompanying right of complaint—could ad-
vance this kind of goal for the audience. Complaining, after all, does not tend to im-
prove one’s epistemic state, and an audience member will only act on her right to
complain after she has realized that the speaker’s testimony was false and adjusted
her credences accordingly. One idea might be that the speaker has an interest in
avoiding such complaints and so will avoid testifying unless she believes her words
to be true. But this sort of explanation lands us squarely in evidential territory—such
facts about the interests of the speaker provide evidence for her sincerity which, to-
gether with assumptions about her credentials as an epistemic agent, will suggest
that there is a reliable connection between her testimony and the truth. An alterna-
tive possibility is that assurance gives practical reasons for belief—but again, it is not
clearhow relying on a speaker’s assurance in formingbeliefs will serve an audience’s
practical interests, as a stable or general rule. Or perhaps testimony gives the audi-
ence a moral reason to believe, though this seems to get things the wrong way
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around; on the assurance view, testimony introduces obligations for the speaker,
rather than the audience. There is doubtless much to be said here on the part of
the assurance view, and the topic is fascinating, but in order to be fully convincing,
it would need a substantive account of reasons for belief and a deeper explanation
of how assurance functions as a source of such reasons, without secretly slipping in
evidentialist commitments.
Stylistically, the book is engaging and refreshingly readable; however, its easy
conversational tone may come at the cost of structure. The same core set of dia-
lectical points are revisited in each chapter, though from varying angles and per-
spectives; while this is helpful in reinforcing themajor commitments of the book,
it could be disorienting for a reader looking to find a streamlined argument for a
particular thesis. However, one advantage to this approach is that it ties together a
great deal of seemingly independent threads of literature in the philosophy of
language, revealing common methodologies and commitments with regard to
the social/relational features of language and testimony. Thus, it offers a novel
and helpful birds-eye perspective on a large swath of literature and would make
an excellent core text for an introductory class on speech acts or testimony, if sup-
plemented by additional readings. Thoughmany of the issues taken up in The Ex-
change of Words are not new, Moran distills them in a fresh and illuminating way by
closely examining them against a common backdrop of social/relational consid-
erations. Researchers approaching the topic of testimony from a variety of differ-
ent backgrounds—including epistemology, speech act theory, and interpersonal
normativity, to name just a few—will stand to learn much from this philosophically
rich book and will come away challenged to reexamine their ideas about the epi-
stemic significance of speech.
Jessica Keiser
University of Leeds
Orend, Brian. War and Political Theory.
Medford: Polity, 2019. Pp. 240. $64.95 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).
This book aims to provide an interdisciplinary overview of war—focusing on
three questions, what is war, what is to be done about it, and how will it develop
in the future—that will be both accessible to beginners and profitable to experts.
The book begins with a chapter on the ontology of war (addressing the first ques-
tion), followed by one chapter each on realism and pacifism and three chapters
on just war theory, one each on jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum (these
five chapters together address the second question), and concludes with a chap-
ter on the future of warfare (addressing the third question).
I presume that the primary intended audience of this book is students in clas-
ses on themorality, law, or politics of war, and I think that it could indeed serve as
a useful textbook in such classes. It is well researched and sourced (although un-
fortunately it includes neither a bibliography nor an index), neatly organized,
and stocked with examples, some quite detailed, that could serve to motivate
and inform class discussions. I can, then, recommend this book to teachers of
such classes, or to the proverbial “intelligent general reader” interested in a good
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